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THE “MAJESTIC EQUALITY” OF THE LAW:
WHY CONSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES DO NOT PRODUCE EQUALITY
Harry Arthurs 1
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.
Anatole France, Le lys rouge (1894)
Introduction
Two epidemiological studies — the Whitehall Studies of 1967 and 1988 — famously
demonstrated that socio-economic status is a primary determinant of health outcomes.
(Marmot & Smith, 1997) By locating a large cohort of British civil servants on a socialclass gradient, researchers were able to show that individuals at successively lower
levels on that gradient experienced diminishing prospects of good health and
longevity. This conclusion was complemented by subsequent studies that concluded
that degrees of inequality in a society — rather than absolute levels of wealth and
status — are a very strong predictor of health outcomes. (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009)
Finally, we know from other studies that women, young people, the disabled, the
unskilled and uneducated, members of racialized groups and recent immigrants tend to
be over-represented in the lower ranges of the class gradient. To the best of my
knowledge, no single comprehensive epidemiological study has sought to test
empirically the link between economic or social inequality, on the one hand, and the
overall quality of citizenship on the other. However, there is little reason to doubt that
Anatole France’s mordant reflections on the relationship of law and equality would be
confirmed by such a study. We already know that inequality correlates with diminished
access to education, employment, housing and other social goods, with lower rates of
participation in civic and cultural life, and with higher rates of abusive treatment at the
hands of public and private bureaucracies. It would hardly be surprising to learn that
it also correlates closely with the denigration or denial of legal and political rights.
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Finally, recent research suggests that advanced economies are becoming more
unequal for a variety of reasons, including the growing importance of inherited wealth
and the dominance of the “grabbing hand” model of corporate governance, which
enables those who control the distribution of profits to claim disproportionate shares for
themselves. (Picketty 2014) If this is true, if the gradient I have described is becoming
steeper and steeper, we can expect that the distribution of social goods is becoming
less and less fair; that the vulnerable populations mentioned above are likely to
experience greater and greater deprivation and exclusion; and that the gap between
law’s promise and its performance is likely to grow at an alarming rate.
What should we do about inequality?
Some believe that nothing can or should be done. Inequality (they maintain) is divinely
ordained or the result of bad luck; it stems from the different natural endowments of
individuals or racialized and gendered groups; or it is a punishment for sin and sloth.
On the other hand, some view inequality as a positive good. The desire to earn more
or the fear of earning less motivates individuals to make rational decisions that in turn
produce efficient market outcomes which, in the long run, are in the interests of
everyone. By contrast (they argue) measures to constrain or correct inequality —
progressive taxation, social transfers, minimum wages — impose “job-killing” burdens
on market economies, discourage entrepreneurship, dampen productivity and cause
capital flight.
Those who favour positive action to reduce inequality similarly do so for a variety of
reasons.

Some believe that greater equality will produce greater political stability,

improve economic performance or reduce crime and other social harms. Others
believe that equality is a moral imperative in itself, an indispensable condition for the
achievement of true democracy and the full realization of human capacities. Still others
believe, more modestly, that equality rests on a logical presumption that needs no
normative defence.

Moreover, within the egalitarian camp, opinions differ on how best

to flatten the gradient I have described so as to achieve greater social inclusion. Some
(though not very plausibly) favour revolution; others argue that change must be the
product of long-term political, social and cultural mobilization; still others believe that
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constitutional entrenchment of social and economic equality rights offers the easiest,
fastest and surest route to a just society.

Much as I admire their motives and support

their aims, I believe that advocates of this last position are mistaken. In this essay, I
will offer a brief history of failed projects in constitutional egalitarianism, explain why
they are unlikely to succeed in the future, and describe how such projects have
sometimes, albeit unintentionally, produced outcomes that inhibit rather than advance
the cause of equality. However, I will conclude by acknowledging that law can indeed
contribute modestly to the cause of equality.
Constitutional egalitarianism in the 20th century:

A short history

In Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, Michael Mazower points out that in the
aftermath of the Great War, many European countries adopted new constitutions that
proclaimed principles of democracy and equality and contained state-of-the-art
protections for social, labour and other egalitarian rights. But by 1940, he reminds us,
all of those constitutions and their egalitarian projects had been abandoned in the face
of economic or political crises, outbreaks of nationalism or xenophobia, revolutions or
wars. (Mazower 1998) By contrast, the basic laws adopted after 1945 by many
European capitalist democracies and in the Anglosphere largely remain in force today.
However, their longevity has exposed a certain contradiction in their architecture and
operation. (A different narrative prevails in the global south, and in the former people’s
republics.)
On the one hand, most post-1945 constitutions promised equal rights for men and
women, for people of all races and religions, and in due course for previously
stigmatized groups and individuals. (Law & Versteeg 2011) Imperfectly and subject to
significant caveats, those constitutional promises have come to be honoured most of
the time in most of those countries with regard to most legal relations amongst citizens
and with the state. In general, men and women enjoy more nearly equal legal rights
than they used to; religious and racial minorities less often suffer formal discrimination
at the hands of the state; members of historically dis-favoured groups — homosexuals
and the disabled, for example — enjoy somewhat increased legal protection and
support. And finally, postwar constitutional egalitarianism at the national level has
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been buttressed by the intellectual inspiration, the normative legitimacy, and (to a
lesser extent) the juridical effect of transnational legal regimes and discursive
networks. 2
These are not inconsiderable achievements, but they do not themselves speak directly
to the irony that Anatole France identified. By contrast, for some three decades after
1945 most capitalist democracies also pursued practical strategies to reduce economic
and social inequality. These strategies — sometimes mandated by constitutional
language, sometimes not — bear a variety of names: the postwar or Fordist
compromise, welfare capitalism, social democracy, corporatism or coordinated market
economies. But they had a good deal in common. Almost everywhere they included
progressive taxation, the generous provision of social goods in cash or kind, the
promotion of full employment, the aggregation of countervailing power in trade unions,
credit unions or cooperatives and a degree of market regulation or state ownership
designed to prevent undue concentrations or abuses of power.(Judt 2005)
These egalitarian strategies were highly successful in reducing inequality or mitigating
its effects. However, by the 1980s, the ascendant forces of neo-liberalism had
successfully dismissed them on the grounds that they supposedly impeded economic
progress, imposed unacceptable and unsustainable burdens of taxation, interfered
with individual freedom and —a telling, if hypocritical, criticism — failed in their
meliorative ambitions and ultimately injured those they were meant to assist. As
postwar egalitarian strategies fell into disrepute and disarray in many countries, social
and economic inequality began to rise again (especially in the Anglosphere) returning
ultimately to levels not seen for most of the 20th century. This dramatic reversal could
hardly have been achieved by stealth; nor was it. Rather, it was explicitly advocated
on the premise that “a rising tide lifts all boats”, that allowing the rich to get richer will
result in benefits for all — more and better jobs, a larger tax base and reduced tax
rates, even increased support for necessary public expenditures. 3 What matters,
2
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neo-liberals argued, is not inequality per se but the absolute standard of living enjoyed
by ordinary citizens which (they claimed) would rise as the economy flourishes.
Alas, that is not quite how things have turned out. The deregulation of markets,
cutbacks in the welfare state, reduction in the taxes paid by the wealthy and by
corporations, the dismantling of centres of countervailing power and other neo-liberal
policies have indeed (as intended) allowed the rich to get much richer. However while
the situation differs from country to country, these measures have not only greatly
increased economic and social inequality; in many countries they have left large
segments of the population worse off in absolute terms than they were 30 or 40 years
ago. (Atkinson & Morelli 2014) Young people coming onto the labour market face
bleaker prospects than their predecessors; pensions promised to many retired workers
and prospective retirees will be paid only in part or not at all; many working class and
middle class families that sunk their savings into home ownership have lost them
altogether, or are at risk of doing so; local businesses that once functioned as engines
of economic growth and social mobility are facing ruin; essential elements of
infrastructure — from universities to social housing to public transport — survive on
short rations; and the unemployed and unemployable receive much less help from the
state than they used to. In short, the “bottom 90%” — those most dependent on statesponsored egalitarian policies — have borne the brunt of the neo-liberal revolution,
rather than the “top 10%”; and the gap between them is growing. In consequence,
some argue, the vastly unequal distribution of political power and influence in some
countries threatens the very foundations of democratic governance. A rising tide, it
seems, may lift a few boats; but it is likely to swamp many more.
Of course, the return of inequality cannot be solely attributed to the ideological triumph
of neo-liberalism after 1980. Some contend that the postwar years of steady egalitarian
advances were but temporary deviations from capitalism’s normal tendency to extreme
instability (Streek 2011) and inequality (Picketty 2014). Other observers identify longterm trends that have contributed to the return of inequality. Technology has erased
Friedman and other supply-side and neo-liberal economists to justify policies that allow the rich to
accumulate wealth, whose beneficial effects will then “trickle down” in the form of investments, jobs and
consumer expenditures.
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many of the well-paid, secure industrial jobs that underpinned the welfare state (Stone
& Arthurs 2013, Appendix); working class culture and consciousness have dissipated
and with them labour’s leverage in industrial and political struggles (Arthurs 2011); and
the collateral damage wrought by some failed experiments in social engineering has
alienated former supporters and potential beneficiaries of the welfare state.
Globalization, of course, has played its part too: it has reduced the willingness of most
states to remedy inequality for fear of harming their competitive position and/or credit
rating. Moreover, to be fair, it has also reduced their capacity to do so by providing
capital with an “exit” option that enables corporations, in effect, to conduct a political
strike against policies they deem undesirable. And finally, the global financial crisis of
2008 has enabled neo-liberalism to re-brand itself as “austerity”, as a set of
extraordinary measures reversing the egalitarian tendencies of the welfare state not
(ostensibly) out of ideological conviction but in response to force majeure.
Thus we come to the question that animates this essay: After 1945, in most
advanced capitalist democracies, the “majestic equality” of the law was not only
proclaimed by their constitutions but apparently, for a time, translated into policies that
improved the lives of their citizens. Fewer people actually had to sleep under bridges,
beg in the streets or steal bread. However, in recent decades, economic and social
inequality have grown apace and become more entrenched, with especially deleterious
consequences for vulnerable populations in the lower reaches of the socio-economic
gradient. Growing inequality, however, has coincided not with a retrenchment in legal
guarantees but oddly — in some countries — with their apparent expansion. Respect
for the “rule of law” was declared by neo-liberals to be indispensable to the health of
national and global economies (Garth & Dezalay 2002); new bills of rights were
adopted in Canada, the United Kingdom and South Africa; legislation extended the
rights of marginalized groups in many countries; numerous dictatorships in the global
south were replaced by rights-respecting democracies; and “social inclusion” became a
staple of political discourse across Europe. But significant numbers of people —
sometimes even more — still slept under bridges, begged in the streets and stole
bread.
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In short, there appears to be little correlation between actual-existing social and
economic equality and the legal rights and rhetoric that supposedly proclaim and
entrench it. In the next section of this essay, I will attempt to explain why this might be
so.
Why constitutions often fail to achieve equality and sometimes reinforce it
My “short history” of constitutional egalitarianism can be read as suggesting that law
operates in relative isolation from society and the economy, that the social
consequences of law are marginal at best, that there is no point in attempting the
mobilization of the legal system in order to advance egalitarianism (and by inference,
that law is neither a primary source nor an effective bulwark of inequality). Not quite:
law does something; but there is often an observable gap between what law promises
and what it delivers.(Nelken 1981, Gould & Barclay 2012) Thus, fundamental changes in
social relations are more often ratified by law than initiated by it; the principles of law
are often trumped by systemic malfunctions; and even apparently clear instances of
equality-seeking groups and individuals successfully invoking law turn out, upon closer
examination, to have resulted in quite different outcomes. (Rosenberg 2008)

All of

these are well-known problems for those who seek to remedy inequality by recourse to
law. But I want to make several yet more fundamental points.

First, law not only empowers equality-seeking groups; it sometimes disempowers them
as well. By offering them the prospect, the hope, of achieving their goals without the
psychic and material costs of mobilization and struggle, legal recourse tempts them to
abandon struggle or the threat of struggle. In part this is for technical and tactical
reasons: courts may deny equality-seekers the legal remedies they would otherwise be
entitled to if they are themselves in breach of the law. In part, however, it is a matter of
self-perception: equality-seekers who go to law do so because they think of themselves
as members of a community with justiciable claims to social justice. By contrast,
equality-seekers who mobilize for political, social or economic action are almost by
definition more alienated from the system, more prepared to challenge it from the
outside, less willing to accept the premises on which the system itself is constructed.
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And finally, it has often been observed that law mystifies and obfuscates. It makes
appear as normal what ought to be seen as outrageous; it confers an appearance of
invincible logic and indisputable virtue on what are at bottom arbitrary value choices. It
is difficult to persuade people to mobilize against what is “normal”, logical and virtuous.
(Kennedy 1997) Much the same could be said about economics.

Second, almost by definition law — especially constitutional law— legitimates the
existing order and the social outcomes produced by that order. This is so even if the
legal text makes no mention of inequality-generating aspects of that order or mentions
them only in an elliptical or allusive fashion. The primacy of markets as the preeminent instrument of social ordering, for example, is seldom mentioned —much less
guaranteed — by legal or constitutional texts. But if a constitution mandates state
regulation of markets in designated economic domains, it is likely to be read as
inferentially excluding regulation in others. And by not mentioning markets at all, by
treating them as background facts like mountains or monsoons, constitutions are likely
to be read as limiting the power of states to replace them with some other form of social
ordering. Likely, but not inevitably: of course courts and commentators can find clues in
legal texts that support egalitarian, market-mitigating initiatives by the state — if they
want to. But they seldom want to: many judges and academics are heavily invested in
the status quo, and most of those who are more change-minded are sensitive to their
limited mandate to bring about social transformation and to the practical difficulties of
doing so by judicial decree. Let me cite Canada’s experience as an example. Its
constitution protects the equality rights of a number of groups. By judicial
interpretation, those rights have been extended to “analogous groups” such as gays
and lesbians. 4 But no court has yet held that the poor are “analogous” and should be
treated as equal to the rich as regards their access to food, shelter or education. On
the contrary, Canadian courts have held that denying sick people the opportunity to
purchase privately medical services that the state system cannot provide in timely
fashion violates the “security of [their] person” 5 — a clear preference for rich patients
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over poor ones. Alas, no court has yet ruled that “security of the person” entitles
everyone to gainful employment in the public or private sector (or generous social
assistance in lieu) in order to keep their “person” alive and healthy.

This brings me to a third difficulty: the architecture of constitutions often inhibits
egalitarian initiatives without meaning to do so. Federalism represents an example of
such a constraint. Assuming that a government is determined to end social exclusion or
even modestly redistribute wealth and life chances in favour of marginalized
communities, it must have the constitutional power to do so. But powers in a federation
are by definition divided amongst different levels of government. It is therefore
extremely unlikely that any one level would possess all the powers needed to revise the
terms of the social contract, whether through taxation, social programs, public
ownership or the formation of alternative aggregations of economic power. Or to take
another example, most constitutional democracies separate legislative, judicial and
executive power. Initiatives to enhance equality by, say, altering labour market
outcomes will almost certainly require action by executive agencies. However, to be
effective such agencies may have to exercise powers that currently reside with the
judiciary, a development that might well be found unconstitutional. 6 A final example:
the global economy. Whether globalization and regional economic integration represent
an inadvertent constraint on egalitarian policies, or a deliberate strategy to frustrate
them, is a moot point. However, it is certainly true that there is asymmetry between the
constitutional development of trade-related regimes and those that seek to advance
social aims such as greater equality. In general the former are better developed than
the latter. Thus, the WTO and the IMF have more extensive legal powers and practical
means to shape the lives of citizens of member states than the ILO or the WHO; the
development of “social Europe” has notoriously lagged that of the European common
market; and while trade amongst the NAFTA partners flourishes, their labour sideagreement is virtually a dead letter.

6
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A final difficulty: the inhibiting effect of constitutions on egalitarian policies is not always
inadvertent. One example is the relative autonomy of central banks in setting
monetary policy, ostensibly so that their crucial interventions in the economy will rest
on technocratic, not political, considerations. But secreted in the very idea of bank-led
monetary policy is a series of anti-egalitarian assumptions — that voters will favour full
employment, that full employment leads to increased wages, increased wages to
inflation, inflation to capital flight and capital flight to economic disaster. Hence the
use of interest rates to “cool out” the labour market — to frustrate attempts by workers
to gain a larger share of national wealth. Another example: constitutional provisions
have been proposed or adopted in many countries to constrain the ability of
governments to adopt budget deficits or increase taxes. Their obvious purpose is to
shrink the state’s capacity to support a generous welfare system. And yet another
example: fundamental laws that protect property and contractual rights were once used
(and could be again) to strike down minimum wage and maximum hours statutes and
other protective legislation. 7 Ironically, France’s Conseil Constitutionnel has held that
the constitutional guarantees of “equality in relation to public charges” protected the
rich from the imposition of a “confiscatory” tax that would have relieved some of the
pressures on the poor8 (though a revised version of the tax was later accepted as
constitutionally valid). 9 And the US Supreme Court has ruled that rich citizens no less
than poor ones, powerful corporations no less than community groups, may spend
unlimited sums in exercising their right of free speech in the political process. 10
Why do the wealthy and the powerful appear to benefit more often from constitutional
protections than the poor and victims of social exclusion? The answer — I contend —
is that the real constitution, the operative constitution, of most countries is not the legal
document that bears that name. It is rather the normative assumptions inscribed in the
7
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deep structures of the economy, which in turn establish the social and economic
gradient along which the life chances of citizens are distributed. (Arthurs 2007) Those
structures, that gradient, are seldom sanctioned by express language in the formal,
legal constitution, but they are more powerful than any of its provisions. One therefore
comes reluctantly to the conclusion that the only way to mitigate inequality is to revise
the real constitution.

Such an approach is known by the name of “politics”.

The politics of inequality
A basic assumption of democratic politics is that people should have the right to choose
their own government and, by doing so, choose also the policies that will govern their
lives. Inherent in this assumption is the possibility that the majority will favour policies
that disfavour the interests of the minority and, more specifically, that the interests of the
poor will prevail over those of the rich. Consequently, some early constitutions
contained anti-majoritarian, hence anti-egalitarian, provisions: a property-based
electoral franchise, guarantees against “arbitrary” deprivation of property rights,
legislative chambers dominated by wealthy conservative elites as a bulwark against
democratic excess. But as the force of such provisions gradually dissipated — formal
constitutions, remember, are less powerful than is commonly supposed — the rich
turned to politics.
Unlike the formal constitution, the “real constitution” gives the rich a significant political
advantage. To ensure that their point of view is not only heard, but that it dominates
public policy discussions, wealthy individuals and corporations endow professorships
and think-tanks, purchase mass media and sponsor publications, finance conferences
and disseminate propaganda. Most alarmingly, in some countries they are free to buy
as much political influence as they care to afford — to tilt the outcome of referenda or
election campaigns, to secure the favourable exercise of executive discretion in the
adoption of policies and the drafting of regulations, to win regulatory litigation by hiring
the best lawyers to attenuate proceedings to the point where rights-seekers are forced
to abandon them, and to secure government contracts, monopolies and subsidies.
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But the politics of wealth are not always so crude. Sometimes wealth operates by
managing the vernacular of political discourse. For example, economists who believe
in the primacy of markets (which is to say most of them) talk about “efficiency” rather
than equality; philosophers who espouse free enterprise stress “individual freedom”
over social justice; and political scientists talk about “new public management” rather
than de-regulation. Sometimes, too, the politics of wealth converge with the politics of
resentment. For example, workers who have lost their jobs in the Great Recession, or
fear doing so, are urged to vent their frustration on those who are “different”, rather than
those who are rich; workers who are lucky enough to retain their jobs are urged to
think of themselves as members of an amorphous “home owning” “hard working”
“middle class” rather than as members or potential members of the precariat.

This

convergence has contributed to the shift of support from socialist and social democratic
movements to right wing populist and nativist movements (some of which, ironically,
describe themselves as anti-capitalist).
Nor, for several reasons, should those concerned about growing inequality within the
developed capitalist democracies place too much hope in the political revival of the
traditional left. The rich, and the parties of the right that they favour, do not win
elections because they are able to persuade the non-rich to vote for inequality. They
win because they appeal to the many ordinary citizens who genuinely place a higher
value on national or regional identity, race or religion, cultural preferences or social
status, than they do on class loyalty or even economic self-interest. Moreover, the rich
and the right are aided unintentionally by parties of the left that, when in office,
abandon their egalitarian programs under duress, as a result of incompetence or for
opportunistic reasons. But most importantly, those who hope for the return of the
traditional left must contend with the likelihood that politics will less and less be
conducted through the familiar structures of parties, parliaments, policies and programs.
The rise during the recent financial crisis of “defiant publics” (Drache 2008) — of
spontaneous protest movements and fringe parties of the right and left —testifies to the
possibility that politics may never be the same again.
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Perhaps the best equality seekers can hope for is that capitalism will somehow reform
itself, will somehow abandon its unlimited tolerance for inequality and the
consequences of inequality. Optimists believe that this attitudinal change can be
achieved by demonstrating that the full engagement of human capacities, and the just
distribution of life chances that would make such engagement possible, will make
capitalism more successful. Perhaps in the long run, this concept will become
embedded in the deep structures of “the real constitution”. In the short run, however, I
think this is highly unlikely. Rather I believe that, as it did in the 1930s, capitalism will
develop an appetite for change because of a well-justified fear that the system itself is
at risk of collapse. How to foster that fear? Traditional political activity may help: the
risk of losing power at the next election wonderfully concentrates the mind, even of
governments beholden to rich supporters and ideologically comfortable with inequality.
Popular mobilization may help: markets, after all, depend on a degree of public order
and public order is difficult to maintain if the citizenry is impoverished and aroused.
Advances in economic theory will help: we need a Keynes for our time, a respected
figure from the innermost circles of reputable opinion with the courage to reveal
capitalism’s fundamental flaws, the credibility to have those revelations taken seriously
and the creativity to propose plausible improvements.
And what of law?
Conclusion
To disregard France’s critique of law would be unforgivable. But to imagine that that
critique justifies dismissal of law’s potential contribution to alleviating the consequences
of inequality would be foolish. I have tried to show why we should not over-estimate
that potential, and why we should not assign judges to do the heavy lifting of social
transformation. But there is a role for law and good reasons to favour the rule of law.
The first is that those in the lower reaches of the social gradient — in addition to their
other travails — are also the prime victims of quotidian abuse by public authorities (the
police and welfare agencies) and private bureaucracies (banks and landlords). The rule
of law can do much to protect them from such abuse, even if it cannot protect them
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from the most egregious consequences of inequality.

The second is that if, for the

foreseeable future, the best prospects for reforming capitalism involve creating a
sense of fear about its future, then it is essential that optimal conditions should exist for
such activity. If we ensure respect for freedom of association, belief and expression —
core principles of the rule of law — we create a safe space within which critics and
protesters can do their work. The third is that we want future governments and
business leaders with a greater commitment to social justice to come to office with a
clean conscience and a commitment to legality. By insisting on their own rights, they
will hopefully internalize the need to respect the rights of others.
EP Thompson, the Marxian social historian, memorably (and controversially) reminded
us that “the rule of law is an unqualified human good”. (Thompson 1975 at 266) To
acknowledge its limits, to accept that it is incapable of revising the “real constitution”
that is the source of inequality and injustice, is not to deny its practical value.
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